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ENTREPRENEURIAL VERSATILITY, RESOURCES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
IN RUSSIA: A PANEL STUDY
ABSTRACT: Drawing on the Upper-Echelons Perspective and Resource-Based View
of the firm this paper explores effects of human-based resources of entrepreneurs, viz.,
social capital, human capital and entrepreneurial versatility, on firm performance in
the context of a large transition economy – the Russian Federation. The empirical data
is comprised of the face-to-face interviews with 75 Russian entrepreneurs in 1995 and
the follow-up interviews with 56 original respondents in 1999. The finding suggests
that entrepreneurial versatility have stronger positive impacts on firm performance in
comparison to general human-based resources such as social capital and human
capital.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study found that entrepreneurial versatility as an ability to predict
resource needs and resource sequencing has positive impacts on firm performance.
General human capital, i.e., industry and managerial experience, and social capital,
i.e., extensive and diverse personal networks, have weaker effects on performance of
entrepreneurial ventures. Although the context of the study is the transition economy
of Russia, the findings may yield some practical implications for those who start
businesses and those who manage new and mature businesses for better and stable
performance. The ability to anticipate and structure what types of resources are
needed, how much resources are needed, and when (in what sequencing order)
resources are needed may lead to better assessments of entrepreneurial opportunities,
and this enables entrepreneurs to formulate the right strategy to exploit recognised
opportunities. Ingenuity to visualise resource needs also may reduce environmental
uncertainties and harmful effects of external shocks. The research implies that
entrepreneurs and managers should learn to predict what categories of resources are
needed. This quality may enable entrepreneurs to substitute one type of resource that
may be unavailable or costly by another type of resource that may be available and
cheaper to be deployed. Entrepreneurs are advised to learn how to calculate resource
(tangible and intangible) volumes. These skills may help to economise valuable and
rare resources and reduce costs. Entrepreneurs are urged to develop the sense of
timing or sequencing in resource deployment. While wrong sequencing of resource
deployment may lead to waste of resources the accurate and stepped deployment may
enable entrepreneurs to combine various kinds of resources creatively to get best
performance indicators. For example, entrepreneurs may mobilise their own
knowledge and experience to solve a certain business problem at the beginning. If they
can not solve the issue they might approach their friends for advice and help. In case
the contacts are unable to help out the entrepreneur may hire professional consultants
who possess the necessary skills. In this case, human capital was deployed first (free
and available), and then social capital (friends) was mobilised, and finally, financial
resources were used to solve the problem. An important implication is that
educational case studies on entrepreneurial resource prediction should be developed
and used in training programmes.4
INTRODUCTION
A key question in management and entrepreneurship research is, Why some
new ventures survive longer and grow at spectacular fast rates than others in the same
contextual environment, e.g, industry or region. One of the popular explanations for
performance diversity of entrepreneurial firms is the perspective of human-based
resources of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial teams. Human-based resources, i.e.,
skills, judgement and relationships (Barney, 1992, Barney & Wright, 1998), are
assumed to neutralise the liability of newness of entrepreneurial firms (Stinchcombe,
1965), enable entrepreneurs to marshal tangible resources and formulate and
implement the right strategy in the right industry determining venture survival and
growth. Previous studies, thus, found that personal networks (Aldrich, Rosen &
Woodward, 1987, Lerner, Brush & Hisrich, 1997) and human capital of entrepreneurs
and entrepreneurial teams (Bates, 1990, Bruderl, Preisendorfer & Ziegler, 1992, Brush
& Chaganti, 1999, Chandler & Hanks, 1998, Cooper & Gimeno-Gascon, 1992) were
positively associated with new venture longevity and eventual growth.
In addition and contrast to the previous studies of the new venture
performance, in this paper, I argue that specific entrepreneurial resources, i.e.,
entrepreneurial versatility (Penrose, 1959: 36) have  stronger and direct impacts on
firm performance in comparison to general social and human capital resources such as
networks or industry experience. In this study, I attempt to test propositions driven
from the principal assumptions of the Upper Echelons Perspective (UEP) (Hambrick
& Mason, 1984) and Resource Based View of the firm (RBV) (Barney, 1991, Conner,
1991, Wernerfelt, 1984) on the interrelationships of personal resources of
entrepreneurs and organisational performance in the context of a large transition5
economy – the Russian Federation.
It is hoped that this paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways:
First, this research is one of the first scholarly studies that examines performance of
Russian new ventures and privatised firms, and offers a systematic explanation of its
variety. Second, by applying the UEP and RBV that were developed in the Western
social context to the Russian reality, I expand the paradigms’ boundaries to transition
economies. Third, I demonstrate that human-based, specific entrepreneurial resources
are likely to generate greater entrepreneurial rents than human-based, general
resources such as social networks or education. In this way, I establish the hierarchy of
the human-based resources of entrepreneurs in terms of its effects on firm
performance.
The Upper Echelons Perspective
The Upper Echelons Perspective (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) assumes that
organisational outcomes – strategic choices and performance levels - are partially
explained by managerial background characteristics. Age, cognitive ability, functional
tracks, education, socioeconomic roots and financial position of top managers are
regarded as factors that affect firm performance through mediating influences on
strategic choices of firms.
Younger executive managers have more physical and mental stamina, and they
are receptive to new ideas and information and less conservative in decision making,
and these qualities may facilitate corporate growth (Child, 1974, Hart & Mellons,
1970). Likewise, functional tracks of top managers also may influence firms’
strategies: managers with marketing, sales and product R&D experience emphasize
outputs in its strategy whereas those with production and accounting background6
emphasize throughputs in its strategy (Hambrick & Mason, 1984, Miles & Snow,
1978). Socioeconomic background has also been theorised as a variable that affects
firm performance: firms whose managers come from lower classes will experience
greater growth and profit than will firms whose top managers come from higher
socioeconomic groups (Hambrick & Mason, 1984: 202).
Arguably, the assumptions of the Upper Echelons perspective are relevant to
the context of new entrepreneurial ventures because founding entrepreneurs are often
“the firm” at early stages of venture formation. Even at growth stages firms have
‘birth marks” of the characteristics of entrepreneurs because of the path dependence.
In this perspective, social, demographic and personological attributions of the
entrepreneur may explain diversities in venture performance (Shaver & Scott, 1991).
The Resource-Based View
  The Resource-Based View of the firm postulates that firms within an industry
(or group) are heterogeneously endowed with strategic resources, and immobility of
resources provides sustainable competitive advantage to those firms that possess and
develop these resources (Barney, 1991, Wernerfelt, 1984). Three basic types of
resources may provide competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). Physical capital
resources include the firm’s plant, equipment and finances. Organisational capital
resources include firm’s structure, planning, controlling, co-ordinating and HR
systems. Human-based resources are knowledge, experience, skill, and commitment
of a firm’s employees and social relationships (Barney & Wright, 1998: 32).
Intangible resources of firms that are socially-complex and embedded in
human capital are likely to lead to rent generation only if they are valuable, rare,
difficult-to-imitate and organised (VRIO framework) at the same time (Barney &7
Wright, 1998). Valuable but common and easy-to-copy attributes of human resources
provide only competitive parity, ensuring that a firm is not at a substantial competitive
disadvantage because it does not possess that characteristics (Barney & Wright, 1998:
34). Human-based resources, therefore, should have all four attributes in order to
produce dynamic entrepreneurial capabilities that ensure sustainable competitive
advantages (Alvarez & Barney, 2000, Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997).
In the main postulates of the RBV, resources are embedded in established
organisations, and therefore, the standard carriers of resources are established firms
and corporations. In the entrepreneurial context, however, an entrepreneur or
entrepreneurial team may be regarded as resource carriers (Bamford, Dean &
McDougall, 1999, Chrisman, Bauerschmidt & Hofer, 1998, Greene & Brown, 1997,
Mosakovski, 1998). The unit of analysis in the entrepreneurial context is an individual
or group whose personal resources impact upon their firms’ competitive advantage
and performance. Resources of entrepreneurs exist as idiosyncratic and personalised
collections of assets whereas firm resources are embedded in institutions as attributes
of their structure, routines and culture.
Venkataraman (1998: 123) stated that enterprising individuals are different and
these differences matter. Entrepreneurs vary in terms of endowment with tangible and
intangible resources, and this difference may have significant but systematic impact on
venture performance. The uneven pattern of resource dispersion among entrepreneurs at a
given moment in time is a function of social structure (Stinchcombe, 1965). Different
resources including knowledge are dispersed unevenly across the hierarchical as well as
segmented groups in society (Hayek, 1945). This uneven resource dispersion is referred
to the resource heterogeneity of entrepreneurs. The resource heterogeneity forms the set8
of constraints that governs the functioning of society in a durable way determining the
chances of success for instrumental actions of individuals, e.g., entrepreneurs (Bourdieu,
1986).
The resource heterogeneity of entrepreneurs is bi-dimensional: the resource
asymmetry dimension and the resource diversity dimension. The resource asymmetry
refers to the fact that individuals across the social hierarchy hold uneven resources and
capabilities (Anheier, Gerhards & Romo, 1995). The resource diversity means the
different instrumental value of resources. The former refers to the fact that individuals as
members of various groups possess different kinds of resources. The latter means that the
volume and kind of services obtainable from each category of resource is different
(Penrose, 1959), and thus, different classes of resources have asymmetric convertible
power in gaining more resources or to be exchanged in commercial transactions.
A key difference among individual entrepreneurs is the difference in endowment
with human-based resources:  entrepreneurs differ in terms of specific knowledge,
cognitive ability and behavioural propensity (Venkataraman, 1998: 123). Unique
knowledge, creative talent and entrepreneurial aptitude of the upper-echelons (Hambrick
& Mason, 1984) are likely to be valuable, rare and hard-to-imitate (Barney & Wright,
1998) and therefore, may influence strongly the relative success of the entrepreneurial
process.
In this study, I focus on how heterogeneity in knowledge, cognitive ability and
social behaviour of entrepreneurs as the upper echelons of firms influences
organizational performance. Knowledge heterogeneity means the difference in general
human capital such as education and experience (Becker, 1975). Heterogeneity in
cognitive ability refers to the difference in a specific entrepreneurial ability such as9
the entrepreneurial versatility (Penrose, 1959: 36). Heterogeneity in social behaviour
refers to the difference in entrepreneurial networking, i.e., social capital.
Heterogeneity in social capital is the uneven endowment with social resources that are
linked to possession of durable connections of mutual friendship, acquaintance and
recognition (Bourdieu, 1986, Burt, 1997, Coleman, 1988).
Penrose (1959: 36) provided the definition of entrepreneurial versatility as the
instinctive recognition of what will catch on or how to make it catch on, and the sense
of timing. It is referred to a specific entrepreneurial resource the limited volume of
which may restrict firm growth (Penrose, 1959). I operationalise entrepreneurial
versatility as the ability to predict the ways in which various resources are required
and when required in the entrepreneurial process. Entrepreneurs that possess this
quality are assumed to have a wide range of opportunities and choices than those with
less entrepreneurial versatility (Mosakowski, 1998, Penrose, 1959).
Entrepreneurial opportunities are embedded in certain situations and these
situations exist as structured parts of the world discriminated and individuated by
entrepreneurs within spatial and temporal locations. The discrimination process
structures and internalises the resource demand of an opportunity by identifying what
resource is needed how much, and links the entrepreneurs’ vision with real existing
opportunities. Any opportunity has a temporal location, and therefore, it requires a
certain sequence or timing order of resource deployment. Sequenced resource
deployment is a stepped, multi-staged commitment of resources in such an order that
it matches the temporal need of each entrepreneurial situation. The entrepreneurial
versatility, therefore, has two dimensions: (i) the ability to recognise instinctively what
resources are needed how much; (ii) the intuition to anticipate when a certain type of10
resource is required, i.e., the sense of sequencing of resource deployment.
The Russian Context
The structure of status attainment in Soviet Russia, arguably, was uni-
dimensional: political power played the predominant role for favourable outcomes of
instrumental actions (Shkaratan & Figatner, 1992). Other resources such as wealth,
connections and education had been of secondary importance in comparison to
political power. With the transition to market economy leverages for instrumental
actions in Russia are becoming multi-dimensional (Kosova, 1999). Political power has
lost its former “absolute might” although it clearly remains one of the most useful
assets (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 1996). Wealth is gaining new grounds as the
mightiest resource in its utilitarian value. Social and human capital are increasingly
becoming instrumental assets in the disoriented, chaotic transition (Zaslavskaya,
1997). The uneven pattern of resource distribution in Russian society endows some
entrepreneurs with larger and diverse resources but puts other entrepreneurs at
disadvantage. The pre-transition resource heterogeneity of individuals and subsequent
changes in the utilitarian value of resources, thus, creates the resource heterogeneity
among Russian entrepreneurs.
HYPOTHESES
Social Capital
Research findings on effects of networks on venture performance were mixed
despite conclusions about its vitality for entrepreneurial success (Aldrich & Zimmer,
1986, Birley, 1985, Burt, 1992, Larson, 1992, Nohria, 1992). The presence of
networks and its low density were found to increase the profitability of new ventures
(Aldrich, Rosen & Woodward, 1987, Lerner, Brush & Hisrich, 1997). Reese &11
Aldrich (1995), however, found no evidence to suggest that the network size and the
amount of time invested in developing a network affects business survival.
It is assumed, however, that extensive networks enable entrepreneurs to locate
clients and suppliers who are socially bound. This may facilitate sales stabilization
and eventual growth since the embeddedness provides a flexible room for negotiations
that might allow entrepreneurs to convert the social bonds into revenue growth. The
personal chemistry between the entrepreneur and the supplier is likely to enable the
entrepreneur to purchase raw materials and other production inputs at stable prices,
and that might positively influence profit margin. There is empirical evidence that
personalized relations between entrepreneurs and their bankers lead to cheaper interest
rates on loans (Uzzi, 1999), and spin-off firms get favourable rates on equipment
leasing from their parent companies (Webster & Charap, 1993). These arrangements
may improve firm’s financial performance ratios such as return on assets.
Diverse networks are conducive to interactions of entrepreneurs with others of
different attributes. Bankers may be able to build a broad range of clients’ base with
differentiated needs across different industries, and this may enable them to customize
their products building customer loyalty and spread risks of defaults. In this way,
bankers are likely to build customers’ dependence that may enhance their client
retention and wallet penetration capabilities. Trading firms may get better access to
overdraft facilities, speedy cash management and other services from embedded
relationships with bankers whereas production firms may deliver goods in time and be
flexible to ad hoc customer demands. Diversity of contacts may be crucial for
manufacturing firms in the Russian conditions: the wide-spread phenomenon of inter-
enterprise arrears and barter exchanges that plagued the Russian economy ever since12
the late 1980s (Dolgopyatova, 1995) may have forced Russian manufacturers to
diversify their networks in order to survive. The simple production chain of resource
firms makes them less reliant on personal relations with managers of trading or
manufacturing firms although they are likely to gain negotiated rates from bankers on
services such as foreign currency exchange or international money transfer and etc.
The available empirical evidence supports the proposition that firms in transition
economies enter and build deliberately a complicated web of interconnected firms
where assets and liabilities are creatively dispersed in order to reduce the harming
effects of environmental uncertainties (Sedaitis, 1998, Stark, 1996).
Hypothesis 1: Social capital of entrepreneurs is positively related to firm
performance.
Human Capital
Prior research on the relationship between general human capital of
entrepreneurs and firm performance produced positive associations in general. The
literature review by Cooper and Gimeno-Gascon (1992) reported that 10 of 17 earlier
studies had found positive relationships between education and firm performance.
Years of schooling, managerial and industry experience were correlated with new
venture survival and positive cash flows (Bruderl, Preisendorfer & Ziegler, 1992,
Brush & Chaganti, 1999).
Industry experience enable entrepreneurs to understand better the regulatory
framework of the industry, analyse the industry structure and dynamics and possess
market and product knowledge. Those who worked in the industry before are likely be
alert to new opportunities created by regulatory changes. Industry knowledge will be
vital for identification of the strengths and weaknesses of major competitors that
would enable firms to have the right strategic positioning. Knowledge of product13
quality and range is likely to lead to the right marketing and pricing policy that may
increase revenue.
Entrepreneurs that worked as managers are likely to have greater ability to lead
and set up better organisation routines and HR policies. In this way, managerial
experience and tacit knowledge are assumed to influence positively firms’
performance indicators. The empirical evidence from Russia suggests that the Soviet
enterprise directorship and industry experience, viz., banking, found to enhance
performance of new ventures and privatised firms (Bunin, 1994).
Hypothesis 2: Human capital of entrepreneurs is positively related to firm
performance.
Entrepreneurial Versatility
Developing new markets, expansion of product range and output in spite of
unfavourable market conditions is a function of versatile type of entrepreneurial
leadership (Penrose, 1959). Versatile services are not likely to be equally available to
all firms. The deficit of entrepreneurial instincts to anticipate the resource need –
volume and type - of an opportunity may lead to eventual failure whereas the presence
of ingenuity to individuate what opportunities may catch on and how they are
internally structured and sequenced may enable entrepreneurs to maximize profits.
There is virtually no systematic study that examines effects of entrepreneurial
versatility on performance. Ethnographic studies in Russia, however, seems to suggest
that small firms grow in this hostile environment, for the most part, by virtue of a
special entrepreneurial ability. The case studies by Khait, Suvorova & Ageev (1997)
found that the majority of Russian companies that increased their revenue have
creative and visionary leaders who anticipate new opportunities and act upon them.
Oleg Kiselev, chairman of MOSEXPO, a large trading company in Moscow, said:14
“Svyazi (connections) within the academic community themselves will not be very
useful for business. Therefore, I have to look for connections with those who
distribute resources. No matter how far-reaching your connections, they do not always
give you the outcome that you were looking for. So you have to look for various ways,
channels and assets to get deals done in Russia” (Author’s interview, May 1995,
Moscow). The example substantiates the importance of prediction of network and
political power as resources in Russian entrepreneurship. It is assumed, therefore, that
the ability to anticipate resource needs is the factor that governs why one of the two
entrepreneurs endowed with similar volumes of resources succeeds and the other does
not.
Hypothesis 3a: Entrepreneurial versatility is positively related to firm
performance.
Hypothesis 3b: Entrepreneurial versatility has a stronger positive impact on
firm performance than human capital and social capital of entrepreneurs.
METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data Collection
The empirical data of the study is composed of the face-to-face interviews with
75 Russian entrepreneurs in February-June 1995, and the follow-up interviews with 56
original respondents in March-May 1999. Pilot interviews with six Moscow firms
were conducted in August 1994.
In 1995, I selected firms on the basis of a stratified random sampling
procedure in three Russian cities, viz., Moscow, Ekaterinburg and Petrozavodsk. The
computerised database of registered businesses of the Moscow City Committee of
Statistics, Business Assistance Centre of the Sverdlovsk Regional Administration in
Ekaterinburg, and the State Committee of Statistics of the Republic of Karelia in15
Petrozavodsk were used as sampling populations. I created twelve lists of firms (four
industries and three sizes) each of which contained twenty firm names.
Banks were classified in accordance with the following criteria: small charter
funds < US$50 000, medium charter funds US$50 001-250 000, and large charter
funds > US$250 001. This grouping was confirmed in interviews with Russian experts
and Central bank officials. A similar classification has been established in another
study of Russian banks (Lapidus & van de Waal-Palms, 1997). In manufacturing and
the resource sector, firms were grouped: small – < 100 employees, medium - 101-500
employees, and large - > 501 employees. Trade firms were classified: small - < 50
employees, medium – 51-200 employees, and large - > 201 employees. The
classification is based on the definition of small firms in the Russian law and
discussions with Russian experts (Rossiiskaya federatsiya, 1995).
Every second firm on these lists was selected for contact. In 1995, 120
entrepreneurs were contacted and 82 agreed to be interviewed. The response rate was
68 percent. 7 respondents were discovered as ineligible in the field, so that the final
sample consisted of 75 entrepreneurs and directors. There were 50 new ventures and
25 privatized companies. Interviews were conducted with a specially designed
questionnaire that contained questions on entrepreneurial networks and firm
characteristics. In 1999, I re-interviewed 56 original respondents.
--------------------------------------
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
--------------------------------------
Performance data was obtained from firms as well as other sources such as the
Central Bank of Russia, Association of Russian Banks, the Foundation for Small
Business Development in three cities, and local tax offices. About a half of the sample
firms provided annual reports that contained accounting information. In most16
occasions, financial directors or chief accountants were interviewed additionally on
financial issues. The reliability and consistency of company financial statements still
remains questionable in Russia although significant progress has been made for the
last few years to bring Russian accounting practices in the line with the Western
standard.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is firm performance. Organisational performance
may be measured in various ways (March & Sutton, 1997, Meyer, 1994). In this study,
I adopt average revenue growth for 1996, 1997 and 1998 as the indicator for firm
performance.
Independent Variables
Independent variables are social capital, human capital and entrepreneurial
versatility.
Social capital is measured by network size and network heterophily. Network
size is defined as the number of direct ties involving individual units (Marsden, 1990,
Moore, 1990). Network size is measured by the number of ties indicated by
respondents. I presented a table where the following fifteen types of occupations were
listed in rows: CPSU, Komsomol (Young Communist League), Union secretary and
official,  Ispolkom (Soviet local government) chairman and official, official in
ministries, officer in the Soviet army, KGB and police, official in Gosplan (State
Planning Agency) and Gossnab (State Supply Agency), enterprise director, banker,
trade sector employee, university lecturer, doctor, cultural worker, engineer and
second economy entrepreneur. Two types of tie strength, i.e., friendship and
acquaintance, were placed in columns (Lin & Dumin, 1986). I asked the respondents17
to indicate how many people were in each cell.
Network heterophily refers to the degree which an ego network contains
diverse alters, e.g., demographic characteristics or occupational status (Ibarra, 1993,
Marsden, 1987, Renzulli, Aldrich & Moody, 1999). Network heterophily measures the
degree to which an egocentric network contains alters from industries other than the
respondent’s own occupational background. Entrepreneurs were grouped into five
categories by occupational background: (i) party and state bureaucracy; (ii) enterprise
directors; (iii) engineer and shop floor managers; (iv) research scientists; (v) others.
Heterophily captures the proportion of non-industry contacts within the total number
of ties.
Human capital.  Entrepreneurs’ human capital is measured by industry
experience and managerial experience. Each variable is a binary variable of one if the
respondent has experience and zero if the respondent has no experience.
Entrepreneurial versatility.  Proxies for entrepreneurial versatility are
prediction of financial resources’ needs, prediction of social resources’ needs,
prediction of human resources’ needs, prediction of finance sequencing, prediction of
social capital sequencing and prediction of human capital sequencing.
Prediction of resource needs is measured by matching between the need of a
certain resource at the start-up stage and the actual deployment of the resource in the
process of venture development (Light & Rosenstein, 1995). In 1995 interviews I
asked two questions to identify the demand for a particular resource: First, please
describe the entrepreneurial opportunity you perceived when you started the business
(the company was privatised)? What kinds of resources, e.g., money or connections,
the opportunity demanded? The question was asked to let the respondent to18
conceptualise the resource demand of the opportunity and prepare for the next close-
ended question. Afterwards, I displayed a table that contained a list of resources, i.e.,
finance, network and human capital, in rows, and three levels of resource demand, i.e.,
“much needed”, “needed”, and “less or not needed”, in columns, and asked to tick the
appropriate cell for each resource. Thus, resource need at the start-up stage was
identified.
A female entrepreneur–shop owner in Ekaterinburg responded to the open-
ended question: “In order to buy this small shop we sold our old car, rented out dacha
(country house), and borrowed money from my brother-in-law. Then we bought it. It
was not difficult because the shop was in a terrible condition and nobody wanted it
anyway. However, soon after the deal when we tried to obtain consumer goods for
sale our “khozhdenie po mukam” (going through sufferings) started. It was so difficult
that besides money you have to have powerful connections, and you should know
whom to approach among local bureaucrats and when and how to bribe them. In short,
we were so fed up with these complicated rules that we wanted to give up once. Now
everything is stable, and we know how to operate in this environment.” (Author’s
interview, April 1995, Ekaterinburg).
In 1999 interviews, I asked respondents to rank the three types of resources
(finance, network and human capital) to the extent they were - “much used”, “used”,
and “less or not used”. After the follow-up study, I matched the resource need at the
start-up stage and deployment in the process of new venture development. Variables
are binary of one if “much needed” matches “much used”, “needed” matches “used”
and “less needed” matches “less used”, and the rest is zero denoting mismatch.
Prediction of resource sequencing was measured by matching between the19
resource sequencing need and the actual sequencing of resource deployment. In 1995
interviews I asked: How did you start? What was your first step? Have you contacted
your friends for advice first or you started to raise money? Then, I asked to order
resources (finance, network and human capital) in terms of sequence they were
needed: “first needed”, “second needed”, “third needed”, “fourth needed”, and “fifth
needed”. In 1999 follow-up interviews, I asked to indicate the sequence of resource
deployment: “first used”, “second used”, “third used”, “fourth used”, and “fifth used”.
Finally, I matched the sequence need at the start-up stage and the actual sequencing.
Variables are binary of one if “first needed” matches “first used”, “second needed”
matches “second used”, “third needed” matches “third used”, “fourth needed” matches
“fourth used”, “fifth needed” matches “fifth used”, and the rest is zero denoting
mismatch.
Control Variables
Industry (banking, trade, manufacturing, and the resource sector), firm size
(large, medium and small), firm age,  region (Moscow, Ekaterinburg, and
Petrozavodsk) and firm origin (new venture versus privatised) were controlled in this
study. Three cities represent Russia’s regional economic diversity well. Moscow is the
financial and commercial centre whereas Ekaterinburg is famous for its heavy
industry. The timber industry and trade is highly developed in Petrozavodsk, the
capital city of the Republic of Karelia,
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The performance indicator in Table 3 shows that Russian firms performed very
poorly: the average revenue growth for three years was about two percent (s.d. =20
0.33). The mean network size was 82 persons (s.d. = 24.25). The mean heterophily
was 78 percent (s.d. = 0.13). About two-third of the respondents (59 percent, s.d. =
0.49) had managerial experience whereas almost a half (46 percent, s.d. = 0.50)
worked in the same industry.
--------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
--------------------------------------
More than 50 percent of the respondents were able to anticipate accurately
needs of financial (s.d. = 0.50), social (s.d. = 0.57), and human resources (s.d. = 0.49).
If 57 percent (s.d. = 0.49) of the entrepreneurs knew when to deploy their social assets
to get things done, only one-third (s.d. = 0.30) predicted the correct sequencing of
financial resources. The average firm age appeared 9.32 years (s.d. = 11.12) because
of the lengthy ages of privatised firms.
Firm Performance
Table 4 provides the results of multivariate regression predicting firm
performance as a function of social capital, human capital and entrepreneurial
versatility, controlling for industry, region, firm size, age and origin.
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 4 about here
----------------------------------------
The baseline model (1) includes industry, size, origin, region dummies and age.
Resource sector dummy, Petrozavodsk dummy, medium size dummy and privatised
dummy were excluded in the regression analysis due to their weak contributions to the
models. Model 2 shows the effects of social capital on revenue growth: neither
network size (B= - 0.00) nor heterophily (B= 0.68) are significantly related to revenue
growth. The model is not significant. Model 3 indicates that two human capital
variables (industry experience, B= 0.18, and managerial experience, B= 0.00) have no21
impacts on revenue growth. The model is not significant. Models 4-5 report the effects
of entrepreneurial versatility on firm performance. Model 4 demonstrates that
prediction of social resources (B= 0.28, p<0.01) and prediction of human resources
(B= 0.25, p<0.01) are positively and significantly correlated to revenue growth
whereas prediction of financial resources (B= 0.04) has no impact on firm
performance. The overall model is significant (F = 3.44, R² = 0.51). Model 5 reveals
that only prediction of financial sequencing (B= 0.46, p<0.01) positively and
significantly affects sales growth in contrast to prediction of social capital sequencing
(B= 0.17) and prediction of human capital sequencing (B= 0.00). The overall model is
significant (F = 2.08, R² = 0.39). Model 6 examines the effects of all independent
variables and control dummies simultaneously on sales growth. The model suggests
that network heterophily (B= 0.74, p<0.05), industry experience (B= 0.29, p<0.05)
and prediction of human resources (B= 0.20, p<0.05) have positive impacts on firm
performance. The overall model is also significant (F = 3.34, R² = 0.66).
DISCUSSION
It appears that extensive personal networks are not conducive to better sales
records whereas network heterophily positively influences revenue growth.
Hypothesis 1 that proposed positive relationships between performance and social
capital, therefore, has only been partially confirmed. The social and institutional chaos
in Russia that creates the low-trust society where people do not trust and co-operate
may explain the lack of any effects of network size on performance. The absence of
control mechanisms and high cost of monitoring for agency in extensive contacts is
also a reason for the insignificance of network size for performance. The finding is
consistent with the fact that Russians were three times less likely to co-operate than22
Poles and Bulgarians (Pilikhovskii & Stolbov, 2000). Contacts with people from other
industries seem to provide tangible and intangible benefits that boost revenue growth.
Human capital viz., industry and managerial experience, have mixed impacts on
sales increase. Industry knowledge appears useful though the dynamics of industries in
planned and market economies do differ sharply. This finding supports the qualitative
evidence from Russia that industry related resources increase the likelihood of firm
growth (Bunin, 1994). Soviet managerial experience has a negative effect on
performance although it is statistically insignificant. Leadership skills and
organisational routines learned in the centrally planned economies where the main
duty of managers was to carry out the Communist party’s orders appeared obsolete
and harmful for entrepreneurial performance in market conditions. The finding
questions the empirical validity of the argument that enterprise director experience
may provide some advantages for former “red” executives (Eyal, Szelenyi &
Townsley, 1997).
The findings on entrepreneurial versatility tentatively confirm hypotheses 3a and
3b. Entrepreneurial versatility as a valuable, unique and hard-to-imitate resource leads
to greater rent generation in post-Soviet Russia. Entrepreneur’s skills to recognise
what types of resources are needed how much and in what order they are needed prove
to be the survival “tools” for Russian firms. Moreover, the talent to visualise what
opportunities will catch on and what resources will be required appears as the engine
for entrepreneurial growth in Russia. Entrepreneurial versatility as a resource, thus,
has stronger predicting power for firm performance in comparison to general social
and human capital.23
CONCLUSION
The main argument of the study that human-based resources of the upper
echelons of firms - in particular, entrepreneurial versatility – affect entrepreneurial
performance has an empirical ground in the context of the transition economy of
Russia. Arguably, the story that the presence of entrepreneurial versatility partially
explains firm performance indicates the importance of human ingenuity and talent in
all types of economy. In this sense, entrepreneurial versatility has a universal value not
contingent upon context. The evidence provides an empirical ground for a postulate of
the growth theory of the firm proposed by Penrose (1959) that firm growth occurs and
sustains only if entrepreneurs are versatile enough to lead to growth.
Several limitations of the study should be emphasised. The sample size is
relatively small, and therefore, one should be cautious of over-generalisation of the
results. Operationalisation of core variables and their measurements, e.g.,
entrepreneurial versatility, are “rough” proxies. This may weaken the explanatory
power of the argument that entrepreneurial versatility impacts firm performance more
than other human-based resources. Company performance influencing variables such
as strategy, were not incorporated in the model and therefore, the study may have
over-emphasised the effects of human-based intangible resources.
The research implies that entrepreneurial versatility as a variable requires a
more robust conceptualisation and precise operationalisation and measurements for
further research. The research implies that entrepreneurs and managers should learn to
predict what categories of resources are needed. This quality may enable entrepreneurs
to substitute one type of resource that may be unavailable or costly by another type of
resource that may be available and cheaper to be deployed. Entrepreneurs are advised24
to learn how to calculate resource (tangible and intangible) volumes. These skills may
help to economise valuable and rare resources and reduce costs. Entrepreneurs are
urged to develop the sense of timing or sequencing in resource deployment. While
wrong sequencing of resource deployment may lead to waste of resources the accurate
and stepped deployment may enable entrepreneurs to combine various kinds of
resources creatively to get best performance indicators.25
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TABLE 1
The Number of Entrepreneurs Interviewed in 1995
Industry
Banking Trade Manufac. Resource
sector
Total
Moscow 7 9 12 2 30
Size:
Large 6431 1 4
Medium 1221 6
Small -37- 1 0
Ekaterinburg 10 4 6 3 23
Size:
Large 4141 1 0
Medium 2111 5
Small 4211 8
P e t r o z a v o d s k 5845 2 2
Size:
Large 1113 6
Medium 2522 1 1
Small 221- 5
Total
22 21 22 10 75
TABLE 2
Follow-up Interviews in 1999
“Location” after 4 years
No-Contact: 9
Murdered 2
Committed suicide 1
Left the country 2
Hiding from criminal charges 2
Unreachable 2
Not in Business: 7
Hired middle managers 2
Civil servant 1
Local politician 1
Unemployed 1
Retired 1
In Business: 59
Refusal 3
Interviewed 5631
TABLE 3
Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson’s Correlations
MS . D .1234567
1 Network size 82 24.25
2 Network heterophily 0.78 0.13 -.04
3 Industry experience 0.46 0.50 -.01 -.04
4 Managerial
experience
0.59 0.49 -.14 .34¶ .04
5 Prediction of
financial resources
0.50 0.50 .18 .01 .10 -.21
6 Prediction of social
resources
0.57 0.49 .22 .05 .11 -.16 .43¶
7 Prediction of human
resources
0.57 0.49 -.05 -.02 .04 .05 .14 .19
8 Prediction of finance
sequencing
0.30 0.46 .16 -.04 .14 -.13 .42¶ .57¶ .10
9 Prediction of social
capital sequencing
0.57 0.49 .08 .04 .11 -.02 .21 .19 -.16
10 Prediction of human
capital sequencing
0.46 0.50 .14 -.08 -.03 -.13 .28* .44¶ .15
11 Moscow dummy 0.39 0.49 -.02 .14 -.01 -.02 .00 -.04 -.04
12 Ekaterinburg dummy 0.31 0.46 .14 -.33¶ .01 -.09 .15 .05 .05
13 Petrozavodsk dummy 0.28 0.45 -.12 .19 .00 .12 -.15 -.01 -.01
14 Banking dummy 0.27 0.44 .01 -.10 -.09 -.04 -.17 .01 -.16
15 Trade dummy 0.31 0.46 .04 -.03 .01 .17 .22 .19 .04
16 Manufacturing
dummy
0.25 0.44 .06 .02 .07 .06 .00 -.17 .06
17 Resource sector
dummy
0.15 0.36 -.14 .15 .02 -.25* -.10 -.05 .04
18 Small firm dummy 0.28 0.45 .19 -.09 .20 .05 -.18 -.06 -.14
19 Medium firm dummy 0.37 0.48 -.15 -.04 -.48¶ -.11 .07 -.10 .11
20 Large firm dummy 0.33 0.47 -.02 .13 .30* .06 .11 .17 .02
21 New venture dummy 0.62 0.48 -.10 .11 .10 .04 .07 .12 -.09
22 Privatised firm
dummy
0.38 0.48 .10 -.11 -.10 -.04 -.07 -.12 .09
23 Firm age (year) 9.32 11.12 .06 -.09 .07 .02 .05 .08 .18
24 Revenue growth 0.02 0.33 .09 .19 .33* -.01 .26 .49¶ .41¶32
TABLE 3
Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson’s Correlations (Con’t)
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
9 Prediction of social
capital sequencing
.57¶
10 Prediction of human
capital sequencing
.63¶ .22
11 Moscow dummy .26* .32* .13
12 Ekaterinburg dummy .04 -.09 -.02 -.55¶
13 Petrozavodsk dummy -.33* -.25 -.11 -.51¶ -.43¶
14 Banking dummy -.06 -.16 .05 -.01 .16 -.16
15 Trade dummy .23 .26* .27* -.01 .02 -.01 -.41¶
16 Manufacturing
dummy
-.16 -.09 -.19 .02 -.03 .01 -.36¶ -.40¶
17 Resource sector
dummy
-.04 -.05 -.07 .01 -.19 .19 -.25¶ -.28¶ -.24*
18 Small firm dummy -.06 .24 -.13 -.03 .14 -.11 -.16 .28* .08 -.26*
19 Medium firm dummy -.16 -.25 -.02 -.18 .07 .12 .01 -.06 .04 .01
20 Large firm dummy .24 .02 .16 .21 -.20 -.02 .14 -.20 -.12 .23
21 New venture dummy .33* .19 .37¶ .18 -.01 -.19 .05 .19 -.24* -.01
22 Privatised firm
dummy
-.33 -.19 -.37¶ -.18 .01 .19 -.05 -.19 .25* .01
23 Firm age (year) -.21 -.31* -.20 -.21 .06 .17 -.18 -.26* .41¶ .06
24 Revenue growth .45¶ .08 .32* -.12 .23 -.09 -.11 -.01 .05 .0533
TABLE 3
Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson’s Correlations (Con’t)
18 19 20 21 22 23
19 Medium firm dummy -.49¶
20 Large firm dummy -.45¶ -.55¶
21 New venture dummy .01 .09 -.11
22 Privatised firm
dummy
-.01 -.01 .11 -1.00
23 Firm age -.26* -.26* .33¶ -.69¶ .69¶
24 Revenue growth .09 -.16 .07 .21 -.21 -.04
*=p<0.05 in two=tailed tests.
¶=p<0.01 in two=tailed tests.34
TABLE 4
Regression Analysis Predicting Average Revenue Growth (N=56)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Region dummies
Moscow -0.04
(0.12)
-0.00
(0.12)
-0.00
(0.12)
-0.04
(0.10)
0.13
(0.12)
0.00
(0.11)
Ekaterinburg 0.17
(0.13)
0.26
(0.14)
0.18
(0.14)
0.10
(0.11)
0.02
(0.13)
0.13
(0.12)
Industry dummies
Banking -0.19
(0.18)
-0.18
(0.18)
-0.21
(0.18)
-0.21
(0.14)
-0.17
(0.17)
-0.21
(0.15)
Trade -0.14
(0.16)
-0.14
(0.15)
-0.13
(0.17)
-0.21
(0.13)
-0.17
(0.14)
-0.16
(0.14)
Manufacturing -0.05
(0.17)
-0.09
(0.17)
-0.06
(0.17)
-0.00
(0.14)
-0.02
(0.15)
-0.03
(0.13)
Firm size dummies
Small firms 0.11
(0.11)
0.13
(0.17)
0.00
(0.14)
0.16
(0.10)
0.16
(0.10)
0.05
(0.11)
Large firms 0.14
(0.12)
0.12
(0.12)
0.02
(0.15)
0.17
(0.10)
0.03
(0.12)
-0.08
(0.13)
New venture dummy 0.20
(0.14)
0.21
(0.14)
0.13
(0.15)
0.05
(0.12)
0.10
(0.14)
-0.05
(0.13)
Firm age 0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
Independent variables
Network size -0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
Network heterophily 0.68
(0.35)
0.74*
(0.29)
Industry experience 0.18
(0.12)
0.23*
(0.10)
Managerial experience 0.00
(0.10)
-0.02
(0.09)
Prediction of financial resources 0.04
(0.09)
-0.01
(0.09)
Prediction of social resources 0.28¶
(0.09)
0.16
(0.10)
Prediction of human resources 0.25¶
(0.07)
0.20*
(0.07)
Prediction of finance sequencing 0.46¶
(0.16)
0.30
(0.15)
Prediction of social capital sequencing -0.17
(0.12)
-0.14
(0.10)
Prediction of human capital sequencing 0.00
(0.12)
0.02
(0.11)
Model F 1.02 1.20 1.04 3.44¶ 2.08* 3.34¶
R square 0.18 0.24 0.22 0.51 0.39 0.66
Values represent unstandartized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.
*=p<0.05 in two=tailed tests. ¶=p<0.01 in two=tailed tests. †=p<0.001 in two=tailed tests.THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
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